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Appellee
V.
SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
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DEFENSE CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION,
Appellee
V.
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OF DEFENSE,
Appellant
JUDGES' BENCH BRIEF
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The Secretary of the United States Department of De-
fense, defendant below, acting in his official capacity, has ap-
pealed two controlling questions of law in this consolidated
case from the district court below.
Each of the three parties is instructed to brief each of the
following questions:
(1) Whether Environmental Friends, Inc., or the Defense
Contractors Association, or both, have standing to challenge
the Defense Department's clean-up plan for the Venice, Italy,
missile site?
(2) Whether the National Environmental Policy Act ap-
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plies to Defense Department actions to be taken outside the
United States?
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Procedural posture of this case
This case is properly in federal district court based on
federal question jurisdiction. (R. 4.) The case comes to the
Twelfth Circuit Court of Appeals on appeal from a decision of
the lower court on the Respondent's (the Department's) mo-
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tion for summary judgment on two controlling issues of law.
(R. 1.) All parties concede venue in the Twelfth Circuit Court
of Appeals is proper under 28 U.S.C. sections 127 and 1391(e).
B. The statutes
1. The National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)1
"is this country's basic national charter for protection of the
environment"2 and requires federal agencies to "include in
every recommendation or report on ... major Federal actions,
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,
a detailed statement by the responsible official . . . on the en-
vironmental impact of the proposed action."' NEPA's two
main purposes are: forcing agencies to consider the potential
environmental impacts of any proposed actions and ensuring
the public is informed "that [the agency] has considered envi-
ronmental concerns in its decision making process.""
2. The Administrative Procedure Act
Because NEPA itself does not provide a right to review of
agency actions performed under NEPA, persons seeking judi-
cial review of agency actions in violation of NEPA are re-
quired to bring suit under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).6
C. Facts
Respondent, Secretary of the United States Department
of Defense (hereinafter "the Department) is in charge of De-
partment of Defense sites both in the United States and
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4370(b) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
2. Council on Environmental Quality Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (1991).
3. Id.
4. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87, 97 (1983).
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-706 (1988). The APA allows judicial review only to those per-
sons "suffering [a] legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or ag-
grieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute .... 5 U.S.C. §
702.
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abroad. The United States Army, no longer in need of a mis-
sile base in Venice, Italy, plans to clean up the site and, per-
haps, eventually turn the site over to the Italian government.
(R. 2.) During its stint as a missile launching and storage base,
the site, which is located in a one-hundred-year floodplain, (R.
3), became contaminated with missile fuel. (R. 3.) Considered
toxic in high doses and possibly carcinogenic with long-term
exposure, the missile fuel lies up to twenty-four inches below
the surface of the soil. (R. 3.) The missile fuel is transported
along with the soil when the soil is washed away by erosion.
(R. 3.)
The Army plans to clean up this contamination by having
its own employees apply Biocore, a genetically engineered mi-
croorganism, to the missile fuel. (R. 3.) The Army's testing to
date, performed only at the Army's laboratories and con-
trolled-environment greenhouses at the Aberdeen Proving
Grounds in Maryland, indicates that Biocore will eat the mis-
sile fuel in the soil and will die off when the fuel is gone. (R.
3). The Army claims that once dead, the microorganisms will
pose no further threat to the environment. (R. 3.) To test this
theory, Army personnel will test the soil following application
of Biocore. (R. 3.)
The only documents ever prepared concerning the envi-
ronmental effects of Biocore were a "Summary Environmental
Analysis of the Venice, Italy, Missile Site Clean-up," (R. 3),
and an "environmental assessment."' (R. 4.) The "Summary
Environmental Analysis" includes a statement of compliance
with Executive Order 12,114;1 a history of the Venice missile
site; statements about the methods used to detect the missile
fuel contamination; statements about the laboratory use of Bi-
ocore at Aberdeen; and, statements about the cost of clean-up
using Biocore versus the cost of clean-up using incineration of
6. An environmental assessment entails an agency making a threshold determi-
nation as to whether the effects of the agency's action on the human environment will
be significant enough to trigger implementation of the environmental impact state-
ment process or preparation of a finding of "no significant impact." Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1991).
7. E.O. 12,1f4, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Action, 3 C.F.R.
356 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
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the contaminated soil versus the cost of leaving the contami-
nated soil where it is and performing periodic testing. (R. 3.)
No public comment was ever solicited or received on this doc-
ument. (R. 3.) The "environmental assessment" produced a
"finding of no significant impact."8 (R. 4.)
In preparation for the Venice missile site clean-up, the
Army has administratively set aside funds to cover project ex-
penses and has orally informed personnel that they are to ex-
pect to travel to Italy in the Summer of 1992 for the purpose
of applying Biocore at the site. (R. 6.) Respondent states that
its policy is to consider orders "final" only after the Depart-
ment's employees have received their travel orders (usually
between two and thirty days before travel is to occur). (R. 6.)
Although travel orders have not yet been issued, in his deposi-
tion, a Colonel Indigo stated that he would issue such orders
"unless the judge stops me." (R. 6.)
Petitioner Environmental Friends, Inc. (hereinafter "Pe-
titioner-EF") is an international environmental membership
organization which charges dues and which has as its goals
"respect for the environment and acknowledgement of how
little we understand its complexities." (R. 4.) Response to a
recent questionnaire showed that Petitioner-EF's members
were especially concerned about "military toxics." (R. 4.)
Petitioner-EF filed suit in 1990 alleging that because "Bi-
ocore is still too experimental to be used outside the labora-
tory," (i.e., further investigation may show that it may have a
severe negative impact on the human environment) the
Army's failure to perform a full-fledged "Environmental Im-
pact Statement"" in accordance with the regulations of the
8. A "finding of no significant impact" (FONSI) is a "document by a Federal
agency briefly presenting the reasons why an action .. .will not have a significant
effect on the human environment and for which an environmental impact statement.
.. will not be prepared. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13.
9. An "environmental impact statement" (EIS), required by section 102(2) of
NEPA, assures that when making decisions, an agency will have access to and will
consider "detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts [by
guaranteeing] that the relevant information will be made available to the" public and
to other agencies. Essentially, an EIS provides full environmental disclosure. Guide-
lines and requirements for an EIS preparation are found in the regulations at 40
C.F.R. § 1500 (1991).
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Council on Environmental Quality violates NEPA. (R. 4-5.)
Petitioner-EF, with a total membership in the United States
and abroad of approximately 75,000, has 500 members in It-
aly. (R. 4.) In support of its claim, Petitioner-EF has filed affi-
davits. (R. 4.) Summary of the affidavits is as follows: BER-
NARD BROWN and CATHY CORONADO someday plan to visit
Venice but as of yet have not made reservations or purchased
tickets for travel. (R. 4.) DAVID AND DOROTHY DOWNS, Ameri-
can citizens living in Venice, rent an apartment four miles
from the missile base and "on average once a month" hike in
the "immediate vicinity" of the base. On occasion they even
hike along the base's border fences. (R. 4.) As free-lance pho-
tographers, these hikes afford them the opportunity to take
marketable photographs. (R. 4.) EQUALIA EMELIA, a local
school teacher, owns a home one-half mile from the site. (R.
4.) FRANCO FRANCISCO has vacationed in Venice, staying three
times at a motel directly adjacent to the site, and states that
he plans to return to that hotel on vacation in 1992. (R. 4).
Petitioner Defense Contractors Association (hereinafter
"Petitioner-DCA") is a membership organization representing
approximately 3000 defense contractors which earns nearly
70% of the Department of Defense's contracting budget. (R.
5.) According to its mission statement, Petitioner-DCA seeks
"partnership of the public and private sectors, which results
in sustainable policies of all kinds - tactical, financial, social
and logistical - in all aspects of defense [including] decom-
missioning." (R. 5.) A "safe and healthy environment" is
listed, along with "racial and sexual equality," "a safe work-
place," and "affordable care for dependents," as "social poli-
cies" which will be "benefitted" by partnership between the
public and private sectors. (R. 5.)
Petitioner-DCA filed suit here claiming that Respon-
dent's failure to prepare an "Environmental Impact State-
ment" under Council on Environmental Quality regulations
prior to using Biocore for the Venice missile site clean-up con-
stitutes an actionable violation of NEPA. (R. 5.) In support of
its contentions, Petitioner-DCA has filed two affidavits.
The affidavits of members GRANT GENERAL SERVICES and
HISSON EARTHCLEAN state that they could prepare and exe-
1992]
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cute a contract to perform the Venice missile site clean-up us-
ing conventional technology but that they could not perform a
clean-up using Biocore because the government owns Biocore.
Grant is a well-established contractor with a history of provid-
ing janitorial, messenger, equipment cleaning, and soil purifi-
cation services to the Department on bases in the United
States and in northern Italy. Hisson EarthClean is a new con-
tractor performing military site hazardous waste clean-up only
at bases outside of Europe.
D. Summary of the issues
1. Are members of Petitioner-EF's and Petitioner-
DCA's organizations "actually affected" (or in-
jured in fact) within the meaning of the relevant
case law by the Department's decision to apply
Biocore at the Venice, Italy clean-up site without
first preparing an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) and does any effect or injury which
Petitioner-DCA's members may suffer as a result
of this decision fall within the "zone of interests"
intended to be protected by NEPA thereby con-
ferring standing upon Petitioners-EF and -DCA
sufficient to entitle them to have this decision re-
viewed by a court of law?
2. Is the Department's decision to apply Biocore at
the Venice, Italy clean-up site without first pre-
paring an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) final agency action within the meaning of
the Administrative Procedure Act such that the
decision will be reviewable in a court of law?
3. Is the Department's decision to apply Biocore at
a missile site outside the boundaries of the
United States (i.e., at the Venice, Italy clean-up
site) subject to the requirements of NEPA such
that the Department is required to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prior to
[Vol. 9
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applying Biocore?
E. Summary of the arguments
1. Actually affected (injury-in-fact) and "zone of
interests"
Both Petitioner-EF and Petitioner-DCA filed suit against
the Department alleging that the Department's failure to per-
form an EIS prior to applying Biocore at the Venice, Italy
missile site is a violation of NEPA. The Department claims, in
its Rule 56 '0 motion for summary judgment, that both Peti-
tioners lack standing to challenge the action here because they
are not "actually affected" by the Department's actions within
the meaning of the relevant case law and because the injury to
Petitioner-DCA's members is not within NEPA's zone of in-
terests. Because this question arises in the context of a Rule
56 motion for summary judgment, the burden is on Petition-
ers to set forth facts sufficient to prove that the Army's deci-
sion will cause injury-in-fact within the "zone of interests" of
NEPA to members of the Petitioners' organizations. (FULL AR-
GUMENT BEGINS ON PAGE 527.)
a. Aesthetic, conservational, and environmental
injury
Petitioner-EF may argue that its members' aesthetic in-
terests will be injured if the Department applies Biocore to
the missile site without first preparing an EIS. The Depart-
ment may counter that the injuries alleged by the Petitioners
are insufficient to establish standing because the interest itself
will not be actually affected. In addition, the Department may
claim that the alleged injuries are insufficient to establish
standing because they are not "palpable and distinct," are
"too abstract," or are "too remote." (FULL ARGUMENT BEGINS
ON PAGE 527.)
10. FED R. Civ. P. 56.
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b. Recreational injury
Petitioner-EF may argue that the evidence before the
court demonstrates that its members' recreational interest in
the land adjacent to the base may be injured by the Depart-
ment's application of Biocore to the missile site without first
preparing an EIS. The Department may assert that, although
the Supreme Court has recognized recreation as a valid inter-
est, the Petitioners cannot claim injury to a recreational inter-
est unless they are more than mere trespassers or licensees
with regard to any lands eventually affected by application of
Biocore. If they are not more than licensees or trespassers, Pe-
titioner-EF's members will not be possessed of any interest
which is "capable of being affected by a proposed agency ac-
tion" because their presence on the land may be terminated
by the landowner on demand. Petitioner-EF may counter this
argument by asserting the brief of member Equalia Emelia
who stated in her affidavit that she owns property in the vi-
cinity of the base. The Department may counter that the inju-
ries alleged by the Petitioners are insufficient to establish
standing because the interest itself will not be actually af-
fected. In addition, the Department may claim that the al-
leged injuries are insufficient to establish standing because
they are not "palpable and distinct," are "too abstract," or are
"too remote." (FULL ARGUMENT BEGINS ON PAGE 528.)
c. Procedural injury
Both Petitioner-EF and Petitioner-DCA may argue that
their members have been subjected to a "procedural injury"
because of the Department's failure to prepare an EIS under
NEPA. In making this argument, Petitioners must claim that
failure to comply with NEPA by not preparing an EIS in this
situation has created a "risk that serious environmental im-
pacts [of Biocore's application and use] will be overlooked."
The Department may counter that even if such an injury
exists, the Petitioners have failed to allege that they have the
required "geographical nexus" to the site of Biocore's applica-
tion such that they may suffer the environmental conse-
quences of the project. Both Petitioners should argue that
[Vol. 9
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their members will be in sufficiently close proximity to Bi-
ocore so that they are likely to experience its environmental
consequences.
The Department may counter that the injuries alleged by
the Petitioners are insufficient to establish standing because
the interest itself will not be actually affected. In addition, the
Department may claim that the alleged injuries are insuffi-
cient to establish standing because they are not "palpable and
distinct," are "too abstract," or are "too remote." (FULL ARGU-
MENT BEGINS ON PAGE 530.)
d. Informational injury
Both Petitioners may argue that they, as organizations,
have experienced informational injury to their programmatic
activities. The claim of injury here will be based on the lack of
information caused by the Department's failure to perform
the EIS before using Biocore at the Venice missile site.
The Department may respond with the arguments that
neither organization has been informationally injured by its
failure to prepare an EIS and that the Department is not re-
quired to prepare an EIS simply to satisfy the informational
needs of the Petitioners. It may also counter that the injuries
alleged by the Petitioners are insufficient to establish standing
because the interest itself will not be actually affected. In ad-
dition, the Department may claim that the alleged injuries are
insufficient to establish standing because they are not "palpa-
ble and distinct," are "too abstract," or are "too remote."
(FULL ARGUMENT BEGINS ON PAGE 531.)
e. Economic injury and the "zone of interest" issue
The Department may argue that Petitioner-DCA's only
interest in bringing this action under NEPA is an economic
interest based on the inability of Petitioner-DCA's members
to bid on a clean-up contract employing Biocore because Bi-
ocore is owned by the federal government. The Department
will note that because such an interest is not within the "zone
of interests" of NEPA, Petitioner-DCA has no standing to sue
here.
19921
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In response, Petitioner-DCA will argue that in addition to
its economic interests it has environmental interests. Eco-
nomic interests will not preclude a petitioner from falling
within the "zone of interest" of NEPA so long as it also pos-
sesses viable environmental interests. (FULL ARGUMENT BEGINS
ON PAGE 532.)
2. Final Agency action
In its Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, the Depart-
ment asserts that this court does not have jurisdiction to re-
view its preliminary decision to apply Biocore without first
performing an EIS since this decision is not "final." Both Pe-
titioner-EF and Petitioner-DCA assert that the Department
has made a final decision to apply Biocore at the Venice mis-
sile site and that such decision constitutes agency action
within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Since this issue appears in the context of a Rule 56 motion for
summary judgment, the burden is on Petitioners to set forth
facts sufficient to prove that the Army's decision is both
agency action within the meaning of APA section 702 and fi-
nal within the meaning of APA section 704. (FULL ARGUMENT
BEGINS ON PAGE 534.)
a. Is this Agency action?
Petitioners will argue that the Army's decision to apply
Biocore constitutes a formal order or regulation and thus con-
stitutes agency action within the meaning of the APA section
702. The Department, however, will assert that its preliminary
proposal to apply Biocore was not promulgated in a formal
manner and therefore is not agency action for the purpose of
judicial review under APA section 702.
In support of their argument that the Department's deci-
sion to apply Biocore is agency action, Petitioners will apply
recent case law which finds agency action where there is an
"actual and 'integrated plan.'" Thus, Petitioners will assert
that the Army's specific plans to clean the soil by applying
Biocore, as described in its "Summary Environmental Analy-
sis," provides an actual and integrated plan. Petitioners may
[Vol. 9
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also argue that the preparation of the "environmental assess-
ment" constitutes agency action. (FULL ARGUMENT BEGINS ON
PAGE 535.)
b. If Agency action exists - Is it final?
On the issue of finality, Petitioners-EF and -DCA will ar-
gue that the accumulation of the Department's activities con-
stitutes "final" agency action. Petitioners should also assert
that the Department's decision not to prepare an EIS creates
an expectation that Biocore will be applied. This expectation
raises the possibility of future injury which would cause Peti-
tioners to immediately adjust their conduct.
The Department, however, will refute these arguments by
claiming that before the Supreme Court recognizes agency ac-
tion as final it has required a more immediate effect on the
allegedly injured party than merely an expectation which may
cause the party to alter their behavior. The Department will
also argue that since it has not issued travel orders its deci-
sion is not final, but is instead merely a preliminary decision.
(FULL ARGUMENT BEGINS ON PAGE 538.)
3. Extraterritorial application of NEPA
Petitioners claim that the Department of Defense must
comply with NEPA before it can apply Biocore to its Venice
missile base. The question is whether NEPA applies to federal
agency actions occurring outside the borders of the U.S. when
the effects of these actions are felt only within the country
where the action occurs. (FULL ARGUMENT BEGINS ON PAGE 541.)
a. The presumption against NEPA's extraterritorial
application
Petitioners may argue that the presumption against
NEPA's extraterritorial application does not apply here. They
will also argue that, even if it does apply, the presumption is
rebutted by the words of NEPA, the Act as a whole, its legis-
lative history and any evidence of congressional intent regard-
ing NEPA's extraterritorial application.
The Department may counter with the argument that the
1992]
19
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
legislative history fails to rebut the presumption against ex-
traterritorial application of NEPA. The Department will ar-
gue that Congress does not have authority to apply NEPA ex-
traterritorially. The Department will further argue that even
if Congress does have authority, Congress has not clearly ex-
pressed, within the words of NEPA, that it applies extraterri-
torially; therefore, Petitioners have failed to rebut the pre-
sumption against NEPA's extraterritorial application.
(FULL ARGUMENT BEGINS ON PAGE 542.)
b. Agency interpretation of NEPA
Petitioners will also argue that if the statute and legisla-
tive history are found not to be clear, the court must defer to
the CEQ interpretation which interprets NEPA as most likely
being applicable extraterritorially. The Department will
counter that the CEQ interpretation is not controlling. (FULL
ARGUMENT BEGINS ON PAGE 552.)
c. Executive Order 12,114
Petitioners will argue that Executive Order 12,114 man-
dates that Federal agencies follow NEPA's requirements for
extraterritorial actions. Petitioners will further argue that an
executive order is reviewable by the court regardless of the
President's attempt to proscribe review. The Department will
respond that Executive Order 12,114 is not reviewable by its
terms and does not create a private right of action to enforce
the extraterritorial application of NEPA. (FULL ARGUMENT BE-
GINS ON PAGE 553.)
II. THE STANDING ARGUMENTS
A. Are members of Petitioner-EF's and Petitioner-
DCA's organizations "actually affected" (or injured-
in-fact), within the meaning of the relevant case
law, by the Department's decision to apply Biocore
at the Venice, Italy clean-up site without first pre-
paring an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS),
and does any effect or injury which Petitioner-
DCA's members may suffer, as a result of the De-
[Vol. 9
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partment's decision, fall within the "zone of inter-
ests" intended to be protected by NEPA, thereby
conferring standing upon Petitioners-EF and -DCA
entitling them to have the Department's decision re-
viewed by a court of law?
1. Introduction
Both Petitioners-EF and -DCA filed suit against the De-
partment alleging that the Department's failure to perform an
EIS prior to applying Biocore at the Venice, Italy missile site
is a violation of NEPA. The Department claims, in its motion
for summary judgment, that both EF and DCA lack standing
to challenge the Department's action because they are not
"actually affected" by the Department's actions within the
meaning of the relevant case law and because the injury to
Petitioner-DCA's members is not within the "zone of inter-
ests" of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).11
To obtain standing to sue in a federal court, regardless of
under which statute a suit is brought, the U.S. Constitution
requires that the plaintiff allege an "injury-in-fact." 12 A suc-
cessful showing of injury-in-fact requires an allegation of "a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy."1
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq (1988 and Supp I 1989).
12. U.S. CONST., art III, § 2. Article III grants federal courts the jurisdiction to
hear only those cases that constitute actual "cases" or "controversies." Id. To obtain
judicial review, a petitioner or plaintiff, in addition to pleading "injury-in-fact," must
also plead "causation," and "redressibility." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204-208
(1962).
On the issue of causation (a showing that the other party is likely to or did cause
the injury alleged) the court will not require a showing of absolute certainty before
granting review. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,
79-81 (1978). On the issue of redressibility, the plaintiff must show that the injury
suffered is "likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976). For a thorough statement of these
three threshold requirements for standing see, Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 487-488 n.24
(1982).
13. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
When an organization wishes to sue on behalf of others, it must show that these
"others" are members of the organization and that at least some of the members were
or will be injured by the defendant's action. See, e.g., Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v.
Sands, 711 F.2d 634, 639 (5th Cir. 1983), rehearing denied, 718 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir.
21
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Because NEPA does not itself provide for judicial review
of agency actions, plaintiffs must seek judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 1' Therefore, in ad-
dition to meeting the constitutional standing requirement of
injury-in-fact, the plaintiff must satisfy the similar APA
standing requirement of "adversely affected or aggrieved."15
In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation (NWF), a the
Supreme Court modified the APA requirement by holding
that to obtain judicial review the plaintiff must allege that an
interest has been "adversely affected or aggrieved" within the
meaning of the APA and that the interest was "actually" af-
fected.1 7 This change in wording makes the pleading require-
1983). In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Court initially rejected the Sierra Club's stand-
ing to sue as an organization acting as a representative of the general public. 405 U.S.
727, 739-741 (1972). However, the Court eventually granted the Sierra Club leave to
establish standing by amending its complaint to show that some of its members
would be harmed by the agency action at issue. Id.14. 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-706 (1988). The APA, at section 702, provides a right of re-
view to those persons "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702. The relevant statute here is the
NEPA. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq (1988).
15. To be "adversely affected or aggrieved" under the APA, the litigant must
establish that the injury complained of falls within the "zone of interests" protected
by the relevant statute. Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396-97
(1987). The "zone of interests" of a statute is that group of interests which a statute
was intended to protect. Id.
This "adversely affected or aggrieved" requirement is similar to the constitu-
tional requirement of injury-in-fact, and has the same basic meaning as that term.
Sierra Club v. Morton 405 U.S. 727, 732-733 (1972). The "adversely affected or ag-
grieved" requirement will be satisfied when the plaintiff shows that the agency's ac-
tion "caused actual injury to an interest within the 'zone of interests' protected by
the statute allegedly violated." Committee for Auto Responsibility v. Solomon, 603
F.2d 992, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1979). If the injury falls within the protected "zone of inter-
ests," the constitutional requirement of injury will automatically be satisfied. City of
Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 483 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
16. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
17. Id. at 3186. In Lujan, plaintiffs sought to prevent certain public lands from
being opened up to mining. Id. at 3182. In response to a motion for summary judg-
ment, the petitioners presented affidavits attempting to allege injury-in-fact for pur-
poses of standing and describing how and where members of the organization used
the land in question. Id. at 3186-3187. Approximately 4500 acres, within a two million
acre area, were proposed to be opened for mining. Id. at 3189. The Supreme Court
held that members' use of land "in the vicinity" of the 4500 acres, with no showing
that the members' use "extends to the particular 4500 acres" in question, was insuffi-
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ment slightly more stringent. Merely claiming that the inter-
ests allegedly injured by agency action are "among the sorts of
interests that [a] statute was specifically designed to pro-
tect"'18 will be insufficient to meet the APA's requirement of
"actually affected or aggrieved". 9 Plaintiffs must now allege
that their interests were "actually affected."20
2. Argument on "actually affected" (injury-in-fact)
and the "zone of interests"
Petitioners may argue, based on pleadings, depositions,
and other evidence before the court when the motion for sum-
mary judgment was made, that they have alleged evidence
sufficient to establish that their members were injured-in-fact
in a variety of interests. The interests of Petitioner-EF's and
Petitioner-DCA's members will be "actually affected" when
the members come into contact with lands or other resources
that have been (or may be) contaminated by Biocore. Biocore.
(which is as yet untested outside the laboratory and which
may attack, destroy, or injure things other than missile fuel)
may potentially migrate outside of its initial zone of applica-
tion on the base and come into contact with Petitioners' mem-
bers through their contact with contaminated land, air, or
water. Biocore may migrate on its own (it is a living thing) or
on tires, machinery or equipment, shoes, etc. It could also mi-
grate through the air or water in the event of rain or a flood
(the base is located in a 100-year floodplain).2
a. Aesthetic, environmental, and conservational
injury
Petitioner-EF may argue that the evidence before the
court demonstrates that its members' interest in the aesthet-
cient to establish injury in fact or actually affected. Id.
18. Id. at 3187.
19. Id. at 3189.
20. Id.
21. A one-hundred-year floodplain has been defined as an area which is, on aver-
age, likely to be flooded every 100 years. Shanty Town Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 843 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (4th Cir. 1988).
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ics of the area surrounding the base may be injured by the
Department's application of Biocore to the missile site with-
out first preparing an EIS.2" The courts recognize injury to
aesthetic interests as sufficient to confer standing.23 The De-
partment may counter that the aesthetic injuries alleged are
insufficient to establish standing because they are not "palpa-
ble and distinct, 2 are "too abstract,"25 the occurrence of in-
jury to that interest is "too remote"2" or that, based on the
facts, the aesthetic interest itself will not be injured.2 7 Accord-
ing to this argument, the Petitioners have failed to allege their
interests have been or will be actually affected as required. 28
b. Recreational injury
Since the Supreme Court recognizes recreation as a valid
interest which may be injured by agency action,'2 9 Petitioner-
22. An example of an aesthetic injury would be loss of viewing the environment.
See Coalition for Env't v. Volpe, 504 F.2d. 156, 167 (8th Cir. 1974).
. 23. The Court, in Sierra Club v. Morton, recognized that "[alesthetic and envi-
ronmental well-being . . . are important ingredients of the quality of life in our soci-
ety." 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). The Court did "not question that this type of harm
may amount to an 'injury-in-fact' sufficient to lay the basis for standing under... the
APA." Id. In addition, a recent district court decision acknowledged, that "[tihere is
no question but that' .. . aesthetic enjoyment' [is] among the sorts of interests that.
• . NEPA [was] specifically designed to protect." Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F.2d
546, 552 (W.D. Ark. 1991) (environmental group sought standing by alleging adverse
effects on recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of national forests due to logging
activities).
24. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (petitioner must allege a distinct
and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other
possible litigants).
25. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the
club's racially discriminatory membership practices since he had never applied for
membership and therefore had never personally been discriminated against by the
club).
26. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 722-723 (1973)(White, J., dissenting in part). Plaintiffs envi-
ronmental and aesthetic injuries were allegedly due to imposition of an ICC rate
surcharge which would eventually result in reduced recycling which would in turn
cause these injuries and thus, were "so remote, speculative and, insubstantial in fact
that they fail to confer standing." Id.
27. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n (NWF), 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3187-3189 (1990).
28. Id.
29. The Court, in Sierra Club v. Morton, recognized that actions "impair[ing]
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EF may argue that the evidence before the court demon-
strates that its members' recreational interest in the land ad-
jacent to the base may be injured by the Department's appli-
cation of Biocore to the missile site without first preparing an
EIS. Petitioner-EF may assert: (1) that since Biocore may be
toxic to human, plant, or animal life if it should come into
contact with the lands adjacent to the base, Petitioner-EF's
members would be prevented from using local natural re-
sources and (2) that such injury would be precluded by prepa-
ration of an EIS.
The Department may reply that, although the Supreme
Court has recognized recreation as a valid interest, the Peti-
tioner-EF cannot claim injury unless its members are more
than mere trespassers or licensees with regard to any lands
potentially impacted by application of Biocore. ° If they are
not more than trespassers or licensees, Petitioner-EF's mem-
bers will not be possessed of any interest which is capable of
being affected by a proposed agency action because their pres-
ence on the land in question may be terminated by the land-
owner upon demand.3 1 Petitioner-EF may counter this argu-
ment by putting forth proof, in the form of Equalia Emelia's
affidavit, that at least one of its members in the immediate
area of the Venice missile base is a property owner with inter-
ests capable of being injured by the Department's proposed
action. In response, the Department may argue that residents
of an area which is likely to be affected by an agency action do
not have standing to challenge the agency action.3 2
the enjoyment of the park ... [were the] type of harm [that] may amount to an
'injury in fact' sufficient to lay the basis for standing under . . the APA." 405 U.S. at
734. The Court in, Lujan v. NWF, also stated that it had "no doubt that 'recreational
use' [is] among the sorts of interests [NEPA was] specifically designed to protect."
110 S.Ct. at 3187.
30. See Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Costanzo, 505 F.2d 498, 502
(4th Cir. 1974) (where owners of a site would probably not allow plaintiffs to continue
to use the site, lack of the "possibility of future use [of] the challenged construction
cannot harm the plaintiffs").
31. Id.
32. See South East Lake View Neighbors v. HUD, 685 F.2d 1027, 1034 n.6 (7th
Cir. 1982)(plaintiffs challenging a HUD housing project did not have standing to
challenge the Agency's actions since they did not apply to live in the building nor did
1992]
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Finally, the Department may argue that the injuries al-
leged are insufficient to establish standing because they are
not "palpable and distinct,""3 are "too abstract, ' 34 are "too re-
mote, '35  or that the interest itself will not be actually
affected."
c. Procedural injury
Both Petitioner-EF and Petitioner-DCA may argue that
the Department's failure to prepare an EIS under NEPA
prior to applying Biocore at the Venice missile site will result
in procedural injuries to the organizations and their members.
To successfully make this argument, Petitioners must claim
that failure to perform an EIS creates the risk that serious
environmental impacts related to use of Biocore will be over-
looked.37 The Department may counter that, even if such a
"procedural injury" exists, Petitioners have failed to allege
that they have the required "geographical nexus to the site of
the challenged project [so that they] may be expected to suf-
fer whatever environmental consequences the project may
have."3 8
Petitioners-EF and -DCA may argue that their members
will be sufficiently geographically close to Biocore to experi-
they even express an interest or intent to live in the building).
33. See supra note 24.
34. See supra note 25.
35. See supra note 26.
36. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
37. See City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 670-71 (9th Cir. 1975) and City
of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 483 (D.C.
Cir. 1990). Procedural injury occurs when an organization's members' interest is in-
jured as a result of an agency's failure to prepare an impact statement before imple-
menting its plan. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 83, n.3 (D.C.
Cir. 1991). It is important to note that the alleged injury "arises directly from the
agency's proposed action rather than from the agency's failure to create or consider
an impact statement." Id. at 83.
38. Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 932 (9th Cir. 1988)
(quoting City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir 1975)); Oregon Envtl.
Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 491 (9th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff's members live in a
state which actually experiences the gypsy moth problem and thus, plaintiffs have
standing to challenge a nationwide EIS that will allow pesticides to be sprayed on the
gypsy moths within their state).
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ence its environmental consequences. Petitioner-EF may ar-
gue sufficient nexus based on the facts found in its affidavits
regarding its members' use of natural resources surrounding
the edge of the base and the resulting potential contact its
members will have with Biocore or Biocore's environmental
consequences.
Since the Department has stated that if its use of Biocore
in Venice is successful, it expects to use Biocore to clean up
other bases, Petitioner-DCA may argue sufficient nexus based
on the facts found in its affidavits regarding its members'
presence on northern Italian and other bases. Finally, the De-
partment may argue that the injuries alleged are insufficient
to establish standing because they are not "palpable and dis-
tinct," 9 are "too abstract,"' 0 are "too remote, 41 or that the
interest itself will not be actually affected. 2
d. Informational injury
Both Petitioners, as organizations, may argue that their
programmatic activities have been subjected to an informa-
tional injury. 3 Informational injury results from the lack of
information pertaining to a proposed agency action." The
lack of information is created by the Department's failure to
perform an EIS before using Biocore at the Venice missile
site.
To show informational injury-in-fact, Petitioners EF and
DCA must assert more than mere "setback [of its] abstract
social interests. 4 5 Petitioners must show: (1) that the informa-
tion is "essential to the injured organization's activities; ...
39. See supra note 24.
40. See supra note 25.
41. See supra note 26.
42. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
43. Competitive Enter. Inst. (CEI) v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
901 F.2d 107, 122-123 (D.C. Cir. 1990). "Petitioners must assert a plausible link be-
tween the agency's action, the informational injury, and the organization's activities."
Id. at 122.
44. Id. "[O]rganizations must point to concrete ways in which their program-
matic activities have been harmed." Id. at 123.
45. Havens Realty Corp v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79 (1982).
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[and (2) that lack of such information] render[s] those activi-
ties infeasible; . . . [and, (3) that there is] a plausible link be-
tween the agency's action, the informational injury, and the
organization's activities.""' Petitioners must "point to con-
crete ways in which their programmatic activities have been
harmed. '4 7 All of Petitioner-EF's and -DCA's arguments,
here, will be based on creative use of the facts provided in
their respective affidavits.
The Department may argue that neither organization is
informationally injured by its failure to prepare an EIS. An
EIS need not be prepared merely to supply information to an
organization that feels such information would be useful or
helpful to the-organization." The Department may also argue
that the injuries alleged are insufficient to establish standing
because they are not "palpable and distinct,"" are "too ab-
stract, ' 50 are "too remote,"51 or that the interest itself will not
be actually affected.5
2
e. Economic injury and the "zone of interests"
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp,5 3 the Supreme Court originated the two-
pronged test for standing that incorporated the "zone of inter-
ests" test. 4 The "zone of interests" is that group of interests
46. Competitive Enter. Inst., 901 F.2d. at 122.
47. Id. at 123.
48. The courts have "never sustained an organization's standing in a NEPA case
solely on the basis of 'informational injury,' that is damage to the organization's in-
terest in disseminating the environmental data an impact statement could be ex-
pected to contain." Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 84 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
49. See supra note 24.
50. See supra note 25.
51. See supra note 26.
52. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
53. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
54. Id. The two-pronged test requires that there be an actual injury sufficient to
satisfy both the constitutional "case" or "controversy" requirement and that "the in-
terest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of inter-
ests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in ques-
tion." Id. at 153.
I In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, a suit was brought to
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which a statute has been created to protect.5 Because
NEPA's purpose is to provide protection for the environment
by forcing federal agencies to consider the environmental con-
sequences of their decisions, 56 NEPA's "zone of interests" en-
compasses "environmental interests affecting quality of the
human environment. '57
The Department may claim that Petitioner-DCA's only
interest in bringing this suit is an economic interest based on
its inability to bid on a contract for the application of Biocore.
Because purely economic interests are not protected by
NEPA,58 such an interest is not within NEPA's "zone of inter-
est". Based on this chain of reasoning, the Department may
argue that Petitioner-DCA lacks standing to sue here.
Petitioner-DCA may respond by arguing that it has envi-
ronmental interests in addition to its economic interests.
These environmental interests are evidenced by Petitioner-
DCA's comments to its mission statement which assert Peti-
tioner-DCA's desire to achieve a safe and healthy environ-
ment and safe workplaces for its employees. So long as an en-
vironmental interest is allegedly injured, standing will not be
denied even if economic self-interest is the plaintiff's main
goal in challenging the agency's action.59
prevent the Comptroller of the Currency from authorizing banks to provide the same
services that the organization's members provided. The organization claimed that its
members would be economically harmed by such an authorization (an allegation of
injury in fact) and that the statute in question was "arguably" meant to prevent com-
panies from having to compete with banks in non-banking services (an allegation that
its claim was within the "zone of interest" of the Bank Services Corporation Act). Id.
at 151-153.
55. Id. at 153-154; see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. section 702
(1988).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 and 4331.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1988); see Realty Income Trust v. Ekerd, 564 F.2d 447,
452-453 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332, 348-353 (1989).
58. Port of Astoria, Oregon v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 475 (9th Cir. 1979).
"[A]lleged injuries representing only pecuniary losses and frustrated financial expec-
tations .. . [that are] outside of NEPA's zone of interests and are not sufficient to
establish standing." Id.
59. The fact that the plaintiffs main interest in bringing the suit is economic
self-interest will not bar the plaintiff if the economic interest is tied to an environ-
mental interest. Realty Income Trust, 564 F.2d at 452; see Pack v. Corps of Eng'rs,
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B. Is the Department's decision to apply Biocore at the
Venice, Italy clean-up site, without first preparing
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), final
agency action within the meaning of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA) such that the decision
is reviewable in a court of law?
1. Introduction
In its motion for summary judgment, the Department as-
serts that this court does not have jurisdiction to review the
Department's decision to forego preparation of an Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS) prior to applying Biocore
since this decision is preliminary and not "final."6 Both Peti-
tioner-EF and Petitioner-DCA (hereinafter "Petitioners") as-
sert that the Department's decision to apply Biocore without
first preparing an EIS constitutes final agency action within
the meaning of the APA, e ' and therefore is reviewable.
The doctrine of final agency action prevents the courts
from becoming prematurely involved in administrative dis-
putes.62 In addition to the "finality" requirement, in order to
obtain judicial review a litigant must "exhaust all administra-
tive remedies ' 6 3 and ensure that the issues are "ripe '16 for
428 F. Supp. 460, 465 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (economic interest in shrimping necessarily
incorporates an environmental interest in conserving shrimp).
60. See infra note 54.
61. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines agency action as including
"the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent
or denial thereof, or failure to act." APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1988).
62. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967). The basic ra-
tionale of ripeness is to "prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudi-
cation, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative pol-
icies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by
the challenging parties". Id.
63. Exhaustion requires the court to focus on the issue to be litigated and its
location in the administrative process. Before seeking relief in the courts, a litigant
must have used all administrative avenues available for relief or the court must dis-
miss the case. JAMES T. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 14.06 (1983).
64. Even though a litigant has exhausted all administrative remedies, judicial re-
view will still be denied if the issue is not ripe. VALERIE M. FOGLERMAN, GUIDE TO THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, § 6.4 (1983). Unlike exhaustion, ripeness fo-
cuses on the issue itself and its effect on the pleading party. "[R]ipeness goes beyond
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/5
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review.
To survive a motion for summary judgment on the issue
of final agency action, a litigant must put forth facts sufficient
to prove the two elements of final agency action. 5 First, there
must be an action or event which qualifies as "agency action"
under APA section 7026 and the applicable case law.67 Sec-
ond, the agency action must be "final" within the meaning of
APA, section 704,18 "as construed in judicial decisions.""
2. Is this agency action?
Since this issue appears in the context of a motion for
summary judgment, the burden is on Petitioners to set forth
facts sufficient to prove that the Army's decision not to pre-
[exhaustion] to decide . . 'whether rights or obligations have been determined or le-
gal consequences will flow from the agency action'." O'REILLY, supra note 61 at §
14.06 (citing Abbott Laboratoies at 148-150).
For example, the court here may find that without actual. implementation, the
effects of the agency's decision upon the litigant may be ambiguous. Thus, the court
may decide to dismiss for lack of ripeness until the effects of the agency's decision are
clearer. Determining the ripeness of an action requires the court to perform a two-
step analysis and "evaluate both the [1] "fitness" of the issues for judicial decision
and the [2] "hardship" to the parties of withholding court consideration." Abbott
Laboratories, at 149. The first step of "fitness" refers to "finality" of the agency's
decision. Id.
65. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n (NWF), 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3187-3189 (1990).
66. APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 provides judicial review for "person[s] suffering legal
wrong because of agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute ... " (em-
phasis added).
APA § 551(13) defines agency action as including "the whole or part of an agency
rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent of denial thereof, or failure to
act."
67. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 82-83 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan, the court held that "merely because
agency activities are termed a 'program' does not mean there is 'identifiable final
agency action for purposes of APA.' " Id. at 86 (quoting Lujan, 110 S.Ct. 3189-90 n.2
(1990)).
68. APA, 5 U.S.C. § 704 reads as follows:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.
A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not di-
rectly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.
Id.(emphasis added).
69. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
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pare an EIS is a final agency action and thus ripe for judicial
review under the APA. Petitioners may argue that the De-
partment's decision to apply Biocore without first preparing
an EIS constitutes a formal order or regulation and thus con-
stitutes agency action under APA, section 702. The Depart-
ment, however, may assert that its preliminary proposal to ap-
ply Biocore was not promulgated in a formal manner and thus
is not agency action for the purpose of judicial review under
APA, section 702.
A strict application of the statutory definition of "agency
action""° mandates that the action or decision at issue consti-
tutes "the whole or part of an agency rule, 1 order,72 . . . or the
equivalent. ' 73 Although not specifically an "order" or a "rule"
as defined in the APA, the Court has determined that a regu-
lation is an agency action since it was "promulgated in a for-
mal manner after announcement in the Federal Register and
[after] consideration of comments by interested parties [was]
quite clearly definitive. ' '74
More than twenty years later, the Supreme Court, in Lu-
jan v. National Wildlife Federation (NWF), once again at-
tempted to define "agency action."'75 Supporting the Abbott
Court's use of the term "regulation," the Court stated that
agency action is "limited to actions taken pursuant to a spe-
cific regulation or order" and does not include the agency's
general activities." In Lujan, NWF challenged the activities
70. APA § 551(13); see supra note 54.
71. A "rule," as defined by the APA, "means the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to imple-
ment, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure,
or practice requirements of an agency." APA § 551(4).
72. An "order," as defined by the APA, "means the whole or a part of a final
disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an
agency in a matter other than rule making but including licensing." APA § 551(6).
73. APA § 551(13).
74. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 151. Although the Court did not engage in
an extensive analysis of "agency action" within the meaning of the APA, it did sug-
gest that regulations which were "informal" or "only the ruling of a subordinate offi-
cial," or "tentative" would not be agency action under the APA. Id.
75. 110 S.Ct. 3177 (1990).
76. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3181; see Lynn R. O'Donnell, New Restriction in Envi-
ronmental Litigation: Standing and Final Agency Action After Lujan v. National
[Vol. 9
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undertaken by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in ac-
cordance with the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA).7" The NWF labeled the Bureau's required activi-
ties as the "Land Withdrawal Review Program. ' 78 The Court
held that this "program" was not an identifiable action or
event, but instead merely a name given by the plaintiffs that
"referred to the continuing ... operations of the [BLM] ... as
required by the FLPMA. ' '79 Consequently, the Court found
that the "program" was not an agency action or a regulation80
as defined in the APA.
8 1
In support of their argument that the Department's deci-
sion to apply Biocore without first preparing an EIS is agency
action, Petitioners will assert that Lujan is distinguishable
from recent case law finding an agency action where there is
an "actual and 'integrated plan'. '8 2 Thus, Petitioners may as-
sert that the Army's specific plans to clean up the spilled mis-
sile fuel at the Venice missile site by applying Biocore, as de-
scribed in its "Summary Environmental Analysis," provides
an actual and integrated plan. Petitioners may also argue that
the preparation of the "environmental assessment" consti-
tutes agency action.
8 3
However, the Department may argue that the words of
the Supreme Court in Lujan are controlling law. In support of
Wildlife Federation, 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 227 (1991).
77. Lujan, 110 S.Ct. at 3182.
78. Id. at 3184.
79. Id. at 3189 n.2, 3194.
80. Exactly what is a "regulation" for the purposes of agency action under the
APA after Lujan is unclear. Some authorities suggest that after Lujan "agency action
pursuant to an informal program, that is a program which the agency has not set
forth in a formal policy, does not constitute final agency action. Instead, final agency
action is limited to action taken pursuant to a specific regulation or order promul-
gated by the agency." O'Donnell, supra note 76, at __.
81. Lujan at 3189 n.2, 3194.
82. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp. 546, 554 (W.D. Ark. 1991)(plan in-
cluded "prescriptive measures and standards").
83. Nevada v. Watkins, 939 F.2d 710, 715 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
10132(d)(1988)). The Court of Appeals held that promulgation of guidelines was not
final agency action but instead was "preliminary decision-making activity" as defined
in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA). Id. at 715. Under NWPA, final agency
action subject to judicial review occurred upon the issuance of an "environmental
assessment." Id. at 715-716.
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its claim that its activities are not agency action within the
meaning of the APA, the Department may argue that the
facts in the present case are similar to the facts in Lujan. The
Department may argue that its activities regarding clean-up
of the missile site are merely "continued operations" of the
Army and do not constitute a decision, rule or regulation and
thus are not agency action within the meaning of APA section
702.
3. If agency action exists - Is it final?
Petitioners may argue that the accumulation of Depart-
ment activities leading up to Biocore's planned use constitutes
final agency action. The Department may rebut that they
have not yet reached a final decision regarding the application
of Biocore at the missile site because they have not issued
travel orders to Army personnel who will be responsible for
applying the Biocore.
Since there is no statutory definition of "finality," the
courts have construed the "finality" element of final agency
action in a pragmatic way."4 In 1967, the Supreme Court in
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner"6 found "finality" to exist
where an agency's decision, although not yet implemented,
created an expectation of conformity which could lead to a
cognizable injury."6 Where such an expectation is created, the
Court will consider the action to be final and ripe for review.8 7
84. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). In Abbott Labora-
tories the FDA passed a rule requiring drug manufacturers to include the generic
name of a drug every time the drug's trade name was used on a label. Prior to FDA's
enforcement of the rule the drug companies sought judicial review of the agency's
decision. Id. at 138-140. In analyzing the issue of finality the Court took a pragmatic
and flexible approach holding that the FDA's regulation was final agency action sub-
ject to review because "the impact of the regulations upon the petitioners [was] suffi-
ciently direct and immediate as to render the issue appropriate for judicial review at
this stage." Id. at 152.
85. 387 U.S. 136.
86. Id. at 149-150 (citing Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316
U.S. 407 (1942)).
87. Id. at 149-150. This holding is significant in its relation to ripeness since, as
previously noted, ripeness requires some actual implementation of the agency's
decision.
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In 1990, in Lujan, the Supreme Court narrowed the Ab-
bott Laboratories exception and stated that an agency's deci-
sion is not final where the future effects of the decision do not
produce some sort of immediate harm to the plaintiff.8 a The
Supreme Court described the "sufficiently direct and immedi-
ate"8" harm requirement for finality, holding that "under the
terms of the APA [the plaintiff] must direct its attack against
some particular 'agency action' that causes it harm." 90
Focusing on the actual harm to the litigant in determin-
ing "finality,"91 the Court held that:
a regulation is not ordinarily considered the type of
agency action 'ripe' for judicial review under the APA un-
til the scope of the controversy has been reduced to more
manageable proportions, and its factual components
fleshed out, by some concrete action applying the regula-
tion to the claimant's situation in a fashion that harms or
threatens to harm [the claimant]." 2
Despite the requirement of actual (present or threatened)
harm, the Court recognized the Abbott Laboratories decision
and stated that agency action is ripe for review where, as a
practical matter, the agency's actions require the litigant to
"adjust his conduct immediately.""3
Therefore, in the present case, Petitioners may assert the
holding in Abbott Laboratories"' and allege that the Depart-
88. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation (NWF), 110 S.Ct. 3177 (1990).
89. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 152.
90. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3190. The court did acknowledge that some statutes
(other than the APA) may allow broad regulations to be considered "agency action"
even though the "concrete" effects required by the APA have not been felt. Id. This
exception, however, does not apply to the present situation since the applicable stat-
ute is the APA and not another statute.
91. Although a regulation may be considered agency action for purposes of judi-
cial review, unless the regulation causes specific harm or has "concrete" effects it
would not be considered ripe for judicial review. Lujan, 110 S.Ct. at 3190.
92. Id. Analyzing the specific language in the APA section 551(4), the Court fo-
cused on the required "future effect" stating that even if the action does fall within
the definition of a "rule," such an action "will not be ripe for challenge until some
further agency action or inaction more immediately harming the plaintiff occurs." Id.
93. Id. at 3190.
94. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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ment's decision to apply Biocore without first preparing an
EIS creates an expectation that Biocore will be applied thus
raising a future injury which would cause Petitioners to imme-
diately adjust their conduct.9 5 The Department, however, will
refute this argument and apply Lujan's narrower requirement
of a more immediate effect on the Petitioners. The Depart-
ment will also argue that since it has not issued travel orders
its decision is not final, but is instead merely a preliminary
decision.96
Even though it is the Department's standard practice not
to consider a decision final until travel orders are issued, Peti-
tioners may argue that failure to issue such orders is not de-
terminative of finality since: (1) other actions create an expec-
tation that Biocore will be applied;97 (2) the travel orders are
effectively issued because the official charged with that duty,
Colonel Indigo, plans to issue the orders unless the judge
stops him; and, (3) the Army employees designated to apply
Biocore were told orally by their supervisors to expect to
travel to Italy for this purpose during the summer of 1992.18
95. A decision not to prepare an EIS is final agency action for NEPA purposes.
Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456, 1483 (D. Ore. 1989) aff'd in
part and rev'd nonpertinent part, 884 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1989).
96. See, Nevada, et al. v. Watkins, 939 F.2d 710, 715 (9th Cir. 1991); (citing 42
U.S.C. § 10132(d)(1982))(The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that under
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) a promulgation of guidelines was not final
agency action but was instead only a "preliminary decision making activity"); and
J.T. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 14.08 (Supp. 1991).
97. For example, the Army announced at a congressional hearing that it in-
tended to apply Biocore, it completed a "Summary Environmental Analysis of the
Venice, Italy, Missile Site Clean-up;" it set aside $500,000 to cover the project's ex-
penses; a deputy assistant secretary of defense gave congressional testimony describ-
ing the Venice plans as the "Department's program for fiscal year 1992;" and it pre-
pared an Environmental Assessment and a "finding of no significant impact" on
Biocore's laboratory development.
98. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F.2d 546 (W.D. Ark. 1991) The District Court
held that even though the plaintiff's standing would be at best tenuous because the
agency could withdraw its decision, it does not mean that there is no finality. Id. To
hold otherwise would contradict the purpose of judicial review by allowing agencies to
change their positions whenever they were threatened by a suit. Id.
[Vol. 9
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III. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
NEPA
A. Is the Department's decision to apply Biocore at a
missile site outside the boundaries of the United
States (i.e. - at the Venice, Italy clean-up site) sub-
ject to the requirements of NEPA such that the De-
partment is required to prepare an EIS prior to ap-
plying Biocore at the Venice clean-up site?
1. Introduction
First, Petitioner's may argue that the Department is
bound to comply with NEPA in this matter. In response, the
Department may claim that Congress does not have authority
to apply NEPA extraterritorially. In order for Congress to leg-
islate extraterritorially, an internationally recognized basis
must exist. Petitioners may reply that Congress has the au-
thority to apply NEPA extraterritorially because United
States citizens will be affected and because NEPA proscribes
the actions of United States agencies which are persons under
section 402 of the Restatement.9
The Department may argue against the extraterritorial
application of NEPA, claiming that such application would be
unreasonable under the principles of international law be-
cause it would infringe upon the sovereignty of foreign nations
by dictating the environmental considerations the foreign na-
tions should consider when acting in conjunction with United
States federal agencies. Petitioners may oppose the Depart-
ment's claim of unreasonableness by contending that NEPA
controls only federal agencies and does not place any burden
or affirmative duties on foreign nations.
If Congress has the authority to proscribe NEPA extra-
territorially, the Department will argue that the presumption
against extraterritorial application of United States statutes
applies and that NEPA may not be applied extraterritorially
unless the Petitioners successfully overcome the presumption.
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402.
19921
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Petitioners may argue the presumption does not apply here
since NEPA is concerned with world, rather than just domes-
tic problems.
If the presumption against extraterritorial application is
found to apply here, the next issue which may arise is that of
the proper showing the Petitioners must make to rebut the
presumption. The Department may argue that the presump-
tion can only be rebutted through a "clear expression" of Con-
gress' intent to have the statute apply extraterritorially. Peti-
tioners may counter that rebuttal of the presumption requires
a "clear expression" only if the statute threatens to conflict
with the laws of a foreign nation.
Regarding the issue of Executive Order 12,114, Petition-
ers may argue that the Executive Order is reviewable, that it
requires federal agencies follow NEPA when carrying out ex-
traterritorial actions, and that it is enforceable. However, the
Department may argue that the Executive Order, by its lan-
guage, is neither reviewable nor enforceable.
Finally, Petitioners may claim that the Department ac-
knowledged that NEPA applies when it created its Finding of
No Significant Impact (FONSI), and is now trying to escape
review for its inadequate assessment by claiming that NEPA
does not apply. The Department may defend that it com-
pleted the FONSI despite its belief that NEPA does not apply
and that, nevertheless, the FONSI satisfies its responsibilities
under NEPA.
B. Congress' authority to apply NEPA extraterritori-
ally and the presumption against extraterritorial
application of United States statutes.
1. Congress' authority to apply NEPA
extraterritorially.
In response to the Petitioners' argument that the Depart-
ment is bound to comply with NEPA in this matter, the De-
partment may claim that Congress does not have the author-
ity to apply NEPA extraterritorially because in order for
Congress to legislate extraterritorially, an internationally rec-
ognized legal basis must exist. The Department will claim that
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no basis exists because the Department's action does not take
place in the United States, will have no effects within the
United States, and will not affect United States citizens. 00
The basis for extraterritorial application of United States
statutes are enumerated in the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 101
Petitioners may reply that a basis exists for Congress to
apply NEPA extraterritorially because United States citizens
will be affected and because NEPA proscribes the actions of
United States agencies, which are persons under section 402
of the Restatement. Arguing by analogy, the Petitioners may
cite Supreme Court cases which support their view that Con-
gress could properly intend that NEPA be applied extraterri-
torially because it merely proscribes the actions of United
States agencies. For example, in Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Comm'n v. Arabian American Oil Company
(Aramco),102 the Court stated, without explanation, that Con-
gress' authority to enforce its laws beyond the. territorial
boundaries of the United States was an issue which the par-
ties "must" concede.10 3 Petitioners also noted that the Depart-
ment intends to use Biocore at other bases in Europe and
within the United States. Therefore, failure to perform an EIS
is an action of which effects may be felt within the United
States or may affect other United States citizens.
The Department may argue against the extraterritorial
100. See Tamari v. Bache & Co., 730 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
that Congress' authority depends on whether the conduct occurred within the United
States (the conduct test) or, if it occurred outside the United States, whether it had
effects within the United States (the effects test)).
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 (1987).
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory; ...
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substan-
tial effects within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as
well as within its territory ....
Id. § 402.
102. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991) [hereinafter Aramco].
103. Id. at 1230.
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application of NEPA claiming that such application would be
unreasonable under the principles of international law. The
Department would claim that the application would infringe
upon the sovereignty of foreign nations by dictating the envi-
ronmental considerations of actions in conjunction with U.S.
federal agencies. In order for Congress to intend extraterrito-
rial application of an act, the exercise of authority must also
be reasonable under the principles of international law as ex-
pressed in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES.104 The Supreme Court has
stated that the United States can govern its own citizens if
the "rights of other nations or their nationals are not
infringed."105
The Department may support its argument by stating
that the general principle of international law, as expressed in
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972, of which
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403 (1987). Section 403 provides that:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or
activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such ju-
risdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable
is determined by evaluation all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the'regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substan-
tial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; ...
(c) ... the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regula-
tion to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is gener-
ally accepted; (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3)... a state should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly
greater.
Id. § 403. See id. at comment a (explaining that courts generally interpret statutes
not to apply where to do so would be unreasonable); id. at cmt. g (explaining that
courts will prefer the construction of a statute which will avoid conflict with the law
of another state); id. at Reporter's Notes para. 2 (explaining that it is more plausible
to find extraterritorial application when the law has international focus); id. at Re-
porter's Notes para 3. (explaining that "the principle of reasonableness calls for limit-
ing the exercise of jurisdiction so as to minimize conflict with the jurisdiction of other
states").
105. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 at 285-286 (1952) (quoting Skiri-
otes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941)).
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the United States is a signatory, is that all nations have the
right to apply their own environmental analysis policies when
conducting projects which will affect the environment."0 6 It
may strengthen its argument by explaining that acceptable
clean-up of the Venice missile base should be an issue for the
Italian Government since it is the Italian Government that
will be affected by project delay, the impacts of other treat-
ment methods, and by the possibility that it may have to
compensate the Department for the costs of a clean-up.
Petitioners may oppose the Department's claim of unrea-
sonableness by contending that NEPA's extraterritorial appli-
cation is a reasonable extension of the statute and, within the
authority of Congress because NEPA controls only federal
agencies, which constitutes a reasonable exercise of Congress'
authority. Petitioners may also argue that the extraterritorial
applications of NEPA is reasonable because it does not place
any burden or affirmative duties on foreign nations, because
its requirements are procedural, not substantive, and pertain
only to federal agency actions in foreign nations. Because
NEPA contains language that requires compliance with
NEPA "to the fullest extent possible, 10 7 agencies implement-
ing NEPA can consider any conflicts with other nations as
part of their usual NEPA procedures, thus mitigating any
possible unreasonableness. Finally, Petitioners may suggest
that the application of NEPA would not be unreasonable be-
cause Principle 21 proclaims that all nations have the "re-
sponsibility to ensure that activities within their . . . control
106. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
adopted June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 and Corr. 1, 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420
(1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. Principle 21 states:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principle of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own re-
sources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause dam-
age to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits on na-
tional jurisdiction.
Id.; See Joan Donoghue, A Poor Fit with Foreign Policymaking, in Should NEPA
Apply Abroad?, (Nov./Dec. 1991) ENVTL. FORUM 27.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988).
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do not cause damage to the environment of other
States .. ."108 Therefore, Petitioners may claim that the De-
partment should be responsible, under Principle 21, for ensur-
ing that the application of Biocore does not cause damage to
natural resources either on or off the Venice missile site.
NEPA's application would provide such assurance by forcing
the Department to consider the impacts of the application of
Biocore.
Congress has authority to intend to apply NEPA extra-
territorially and courts reviewing NEPA have not questioned
Congress' authority to extend NEPA extraterritorially. The
courts have, instead, proceeded to the issue of whether Con-
gress intended the Act to be applied extraterritorially. 10 9
2. Congress' intent to apply NEPA
extraterritorially.
If Congress has authority to enforce NEPA extraterritori-
ally, the question then becomes whether Congress has in fact
intended to exercise this authority.110 The Department will
most likely begin with the premise that laws of the United
States are presumed only to apply to domestic conditions."'
108. Stockholm Declaration, at 1420. See Nicholas A. Robinson, Extraterritorial
Environmental Protection Obligations of Foreign Affairs Agencies: The Unfulfilled
Mandate of NEPA, 7 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 257, 270 (1974)(stating that Principle
21 articulates the need for Congressional attention to the extraterritorial application
of NEPA).
109. See infra pp. 55-59.
110. The issue of whether the Venice missile base, as a United States possession,
is in fact extraterritorial will not significantly alter the arguments of the parties. No
general policy exists regarding the application of United States statutes to posses-
sions. Therefore, the issue will still turn on the congressional intent to apply the stat-
ute to the possessions. In United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949), the United
States Supreme Court ruled on the application of the Federal Tort Claims Act to a
United States air base in Newfoundland. The Court held that, based on the lease
between Great Britain and the United States, Great Britain still retained sovereignty
over the base and thus was a "foreign country." The court examined the intent of the
statute and held that the military base was excluded from the Act because the Act
specifically excluded foreign countries. Id. at 219. In the present case, if Congress can
prescribe NEPA to extend extraterritorially, then the question still turns on the spe-
cific intent of the statute to cover the Venice missile base.
111. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 286 (1949); Benz v. Compania
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 143 (1957).
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The presumption exists to prevent unintended clashes be-
tween United States laws and the laws of foreign nations and
because Congress is primarily concerned with domestic condi-
tions."' In Aramco, the Supreme Court echoed the Foley
Court and affirmed the existence of this presumption." 3
Generally, before courts will apply NEPA or any other
act of Congress extraterritorially, Petitioners must overcome
this presumption by showing a "clear expression" of Congress'
intent to legislate extraterritorially. Petitioners may argue
that the presumption against extraterritorial application does
not apply here since NEPA is concerned with international,
rather than just domestic, conditions. To support this argu-
ment, Petitioners may assert that NEPA's purpose unequivo-
cally expresses Congress' concern for conditions beyond
United States borders," 4 and may cite to United States v.
Bowman ' 5 for the proposition that "[tihe necessary locus [of
a statute's reach], when not specially defined, depends upon
the purpose of Congress ... .""' Petitioners may also argue
that the underlying basis of the presumption - that Congress
is primarily concerned with domestic conditions -,' is explic-
itly negated by the words of NEPA." a In response, the De-
partment may note that courts reviewing the extraterritorial
112. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991). See also Tamari, 730 F.2d 1103, 1107
(citing the rule that where Congressional intent is unclear, the court can infer Con-
gressional intent from the "effects" test and the "conduct" test).
113. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (citing Foley, 336 U.S. 281, 284-285, and
Benz, 353 U.S. 138, 147).
114. 42 U.S.C. 4321 (1970). "The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a na-
tional policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man
and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to
the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man ...." Id.
115. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
116. Id. at 97-98 (holding that a criminal statute was applicable to U.S. citizens
outside U.S. territory because it concerned the right of the U.S. government to pro-
tect itself, as opposed to the protection of individual rights).
117. Foley, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1948).
118. NEPA uses the term "worldwide" in expressing the scope of its concern for
the environment and this indicates that Congress created the Act to deal with more
than just domestic conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1988).
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application of NEPA have subjected the Act to the presump-
tion and have recognized that NEPA could interfere with for-
eign policy activities of federal agencies, and could adversely
impact the activities of foreign nations.'19
a. Is a "clear expression" required?
If the presumption against extraterritorial application of
United States statutes is found to apply, the next issue which
may arise is that of the proper showing the Petitioners' must
make to rebut the presumption. While Petitioners may claim
that the presumption does not apply, the Department may ar-
gue that it does. In addition, the Department may argue that
based on Aramco, the Petitioners can only rebut the presump-
tion by showing a clear expression within the statute's lan-
guage of Congress' intent to apply NEPA extraterritorially.2 °
The Department may claim that Congress has not clearly
expressed, within the words of NEPA, that it intends NEPA
to apply extraterritorially. Therefore, Petitioners cannot suc-
cessfully rebut the presumption against extraterritorial appli-
cation. The Department may cite Environmental Defense
Fund (EDF) v. Massey'2' as persuasive authority that the
clear expression must exist within the statutory language. 22
The district court in EDF v. Massey held that NEPA did not
apply extraterritorially because Congress did not express in-
tent within the statute. As a result, the court concluded that
119. See infra pp. 55-59.
120. The Supreme Court in Aramco stated that a "clear expression" was neces-
sary to rebut the presumption of an exclusively domestic application of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991). The court in
Aramco stated that "we look to see whether 'language in the [relevant act] gives any
indication of a Congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond places over which
the United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative control.'" Id. at
1230 (quoting Foley, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1948)). The Court held that the broad lan-
guage of Title VII failed to rebut the presumption that the statute only applies to
domestic conditions. Id. at 1234.
121. 772 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1991).
122. See id. at 1297. The District Court for the District of Columbia held that
Aramco required a clear expression of Congress' intent to apply NEPA to National
Science Foundation actions in Antarctica. The court based its decision on Congress'
primary concern with domestic conditions. Id.
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an examination of the legislative history was not necessary.2 3
Petitioners may counter that a rebuttal of the presump-
tion against extraterritorial application of a United States
statute requires a "clear expression" only if the statute threat-
ens to clash with the laws of a foreign nation. The Supreme
Court explained in National Labor Relations Board
(N.L.R.B.) v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago"2 4 that "it is incum-
bent on us to determine whether the Board's exercise of its
jurisdiction here would give rise to serious constitutional
questions. If so, we must first identify 'the affirmative inten-
tion of the Congress clearly expressed' before concluding that
the [National Labor Relations Act] grants jurisdiction."1 '5 Pe-
titioners might contend that because no such "serious consti-
tutional question" exists, the "clear expression" requirement
is inapplicable. In addition, even if a clear expression was re-
quired, the court may infer Congress' intent though not
clearly expressed in the language of the statute.
In addition, Petitioners may attempt to distinguish
Aramco from the present case by arguing that if the Court in
Aramco required a "clear expression," it was only because it
recognized that the extraterritorial application of Title VII
"would raise difficult issues of international law by imposing
this country's employment-discrimination regime upon for-
eign corporations operating in foreign commerce."' 6 Petition-
ers may insist that NEPA does not pose the threat of a clash
with the laws of other nations because it only applies to fed-
eral agencies, which are already under the control of the
United States government. Petitioners may also note that
NEPA is solely procedural and does not contain substantive
requirements which burden the governments of foreign na-
tions. Therefore, the court need not require Petitioners to
show a "clear expression" when attempting to rebut the
presumption.
123. Id.
124. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
125. Id. at 501 (quoting Benz, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)).
126. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1234 (1991).
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b. Examination of NEPA's language to determine
whether a "clear expression" exists
Petitioners may attempt to demonstrate that the lan-
guage of NEPA does provide a clear expression that Congress
intended to apply the statute extraterritorially. In support of
this argument, Petitioners might point to the purposes of
NEPA. 2 7 The Petitioners may also point to the requirement
that agencies prepare statements concerning the significant
effects of their actions on the "human environment"' 2 8 and
the recognition of the "worldwide and long-range character of
the environmental problems"'12 9 when preparing an EIS. The
Department may respond that Petitioners have failed to rebut
the presumption against extraterritorial application since, al-
though NEPA contains broad language concerning the
"human environment," it contains no clear expression that
federal agencies outside of the United States must comply
with its provisions.
Petitioners and the Department may present a cornuco-
pia of excerpts from NEPA's text in arguing the issue of
whether Congress' intent can be gleaned from the statute's
text. Courts reviewing NEPA's text have not been persuaded
that Congress clearly expressed an intent that NEPA should
be applied extraterritorially.' 30
c. Examination of NEPA's legislative history to de-
termine whether a "clear expression" exists
Petitioners may argue that, although the Court in
Aramco stated that a "clear expression" of Congressional in-
tent in the statute is required, Aramco should not be inter-
preted as abolishing the Court's long-standing practice of ap-
plying additional tools of construction when determining
127. NEPA's purposes are to "encourage productive and enjoyable harmony be-
tween man and his environment .. .and to "promote efforts which will prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and
welfare of man; ..." 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1988).
130. See infra pp 53-54.
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Congressional intent. Under the case law relied on in the
Aramco holding, the traditional tools of statutory construction
were used."'1 In the Aramco holding, the Court analyzed the
statute as a whole, examining the degree of deference due to
the EEOC and reviewing Congress' expression of extraterrito-
rial application in additional statutes. 132 In Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 'Inc., 133 the Supreme
Court held that if a statute does not provide a clear expres-
sion of Congress' intent, a court must then determine whether
the agency's interpretation is a permissible statutory con-
struction. 13  Petitioners may attempt to rely upon Defenders
of Wildlife v. Lujan,133 which examined the Endangered Spe-
cies Act to determine whether it applied extraterritorially.
The court in Defenders of Wildlife analyzed the statutes leg-
islative history in an attempt to find evidence of Congres-
sional intent. 136
Both Petitioners and the Department may offer a series
of excerpts from NEPA's legislative history in persuading the
court that Congress either did or did not intend NEPA to ap-
ply extraterritorially. Neither the language of NEPA nor its
legislative history are conclusive. Commentators reviewing the
statute and legislative history have reached opposite
conclusions.3 7
131. See, e.g., Foley, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1940)(the Court examines the legislative
history of the Eight Hour Law); Benz, 353 U.S. 138, 142-45 (1957)(the Court exam-
ines the legislative history of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947).
132. See Aramco, 111 S. Ct. 1227 at 1235-36 (1991).
133. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
134. Id.
135. 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990). Similarly, the United States District Court for
the District of Hawaii, relying on the Supreme Court's analysis in Foley, 336 U.S.
281, 285-86 (1949), stated that the proper analysis of whether NEPA applies extrater-
ritorially includes a consideration of the legislative history. People of Saipan v.
United States, 356 F. Supp. 645, 650 (D. Haw. 1973).
136. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 125.
137. Comment, NEPA's Role in Protecting the World Environment, 131 U. PA.
L. REV. 353, 360 (1982); see Note, The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA's Environ-
mental Impact Statement Requirement, 74 MICH. L. REV. 349, 360-71 (1975); Charles
N. Brower, Is NEPA Exportable?, 43 ALB. L. REv. 513 (1979); Nicholas A. Robinson,
Extraterritorial Environmental Protection Obligations of Foreign Affairs Agencies:
The Unfulfilled Mandate of NEPA, 7 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 257 (1974).
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d. The CEQ interpretation of NEPA's extraterrito-
rial applicability
Petitioners may contend that if the statute and legislative
history are not clear in showing whether Congress intended to
have NEPA apply extraterritorially, the court must defer to
the interpretation of the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ). The CEQ appears to interpret NEPA as having extra-
territorial applications regarding actions with effects outside
the United States borders.138 In support of this argument, Pe-
titioners may note that the Supreme Court, in Chevron, held
that when a statute and its legislative history are unclear re-
garding an issue, courts should defer to the statutory interpre-
tation offered by the agency charged with implementing the
statute.1 9
In addition, the Petitioners may argue that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly ruled that in the context of NEPA, the
CEQ's interpretations are entitled to "substantial defer-
ence ' 14° and that where "administrative guidelines conflict
with earlier pronouncements of the agency, . . . substantial
deference is nonetheless appropriate if there appears to have
been good reason for the change ... ."I41 The Department may
counter that the CEQ interpretation is not controlling because
foreign relations are implicated. The Department may also ar-
gue that as an agency required to promulgate regulations pur-
138. Memorandum on the Application of the EIS Requirement to Environmental
Impacts Abroad of Major Federal Actions, 42 Fed. Reg. 61,068 (1977). The CEQ
points out that agencies can maintain control of foreign policy and national security
information. Id. at 61,069.
139. Chevron, 467 U.S. 842-43 (1984).
140. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979); Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355 (1989).
141. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835, 1848 (1989).
For example, in Aramco the Supreme Court examined three factors which led it
to conclude that it would not defer to the EEOC's position on whether Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should be applied extraterritorially. The court examined
the thoroughness of the Agency's interpretation, the validity of the Agency's reason-
ing, and the consistency of the Agency's position. Aramco, Ill S. Ct. 1227, 1235
(1991). The Court also noted that the EEOC has no authority to promulgate regula-
tions and has inconsistently interpreted the statute. Id.
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suant to NEPA, its interpretation is also controlling.' 42
e. Subsequent congressional action.
The parties may present examples of congressional action
occurring subsequent to the enactment of NEPA to support
their positions on the extraterritorial applicability of NEPA.
Several times Congress has considered bills to clarify NEPA's
extraterritorial applicability, but it did not pass any of
them.' 43 Subsequent congressional actions, however, may not
be very persuasive indications of past congressional intent.
These actions offer little in terms of Congress' present under-
standing of a statute because they are interpreted as either an
attempt to reinforce or an attempt to reverse the meaning of a
statute.
C. Executive Order No. 12,114 requires federal agencies
to follow the mandates of NEPA when carrying out
extraterritorial actions.
Executive Order No. 12,11411 presents two important is-
sues. The first issue presented is whether courts can review
this Executive Order. The second issue presented is whether
Petitioners can enforce this Executive Order.
The Department may argue that because Executive Order
12,114 explicitly states that its sole purpose is to establish in-
ternal procedure and not intended to provide a reviewable
cause of action, it is therefore not reviewable.' 45 Petitioners
may assert, however, that an executive order is reviewable by
the court regardless of the President's attempt to proscribe
review. 4 6
In support of their position that the Executive Order
12,114 is reviewable despite restrictions on review contained
142. Brower, supra note 137 at 515 n.8.
143. Brower, supra note 137, at 516.
144. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1988) [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 12,114].
145. See id.
146. United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1387 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
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in the order itself, Petitioners may cite Sierra Club v. Peter-
son,4 7 in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held valid
a claim to enforce an executive order that directed federal
agencies to comply with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act of 1972 (FIFRA)." 8 The Department
could counter that Peterson is distinguishable from the pre-
sent case because the executive order at issue in Peterson did
not contain a restriction on review, whereas, Executive Order
No. 12,114 does contain such a restriction. In addition, since
Petitioners in the present case are relying on the enforcement
mechanisms of the APA, review of Executive Order 12,114
may be precluded since the APA does not provide for review
if precluded by other statutes (i.e. Executive Order 12,114).1 9
The Department may also point out that, although the
court in Wayte held that executive orders were reviewable, it
also held that without legislative foundation, an Article III
court cannot enforce executive orders. 5 ' Petitioners may
counter with the argument that the Executive Order is en-
forceable and may support a claim mandating federal agencies
to follow NEPA requirements for extraterritorial actions. The
Executive Order 12,114 states that it was created "[b]y virtue
of the authority vested in [the President] by the Constitution
and the laws of the United States, . . . in order to further
environmental objectives consistent with the foreign policy
and national security policy of the United States. . .,"I and
"represents the United States government's exclusive and
complete determination of the procedural and other actions to
be taken by Federal agencies to further the purpose of
[NEPA], with respect to the environment outside the United
States, its territories and possessions." '52 Petitioners could ar-
gue that, rather than creating new law, the Executive Order
12,114 simply "directs that a Congressional policy be executed
147. 705 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983).
148. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
149. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)(1988). This argument assumes that Executive Order
12,114 has the force of a statute.
150. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1387-90 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
151. Exec. Order No. 12,114 at pmbl.
152. Id. at § 1-1.
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in a manner prescribed by Congress.' 53 Thus, Petitioners
may reason that the creation of the Executive Order 12,114 is
within the President's power and is enforceable.
The Department could counter that Executive Order
12,114 does not create a private right of action to enforce the
extraterritorial application of NEPA. The Department may
cite Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski,'5" which
stated that executive orders are not judicially enforceable if
not created pursuant to an act of Congress.'55 In the context
of NEPA, the District Court for the District of Columbia up-
held the rule against judicial enforcement of executive orders
in Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) v. Massey,' 6 which
held that Executive Order 12,114 does not provide a right of
action. 57 The Department may also argue that the President
explicitly stated in the Executive Order that "[t]his Order is
solely for the purpose of establishing internal procedures for
Federal agencies . . .and nothing in this Order shall be con-
strued to create a cause of action.' '1 58
Finally, Petitioners may argue that the Department ac-
knowledged that Executive Order 12,114 requires it to follow
NEPA mandates when carrying out extraterritorial actions
when it prepared its "finding of no significant impact"
(FONSI). 159 Petitioners may claim that the Department is
now simply trying to escape having to prepare an EIS. In de-
fense, the Department may argue that it completed the
FONSI despite its belief that Executive Order 12,114 does not
mandate that it follow NEPA's requirements when carrying
153. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)
(holding that an executive order which directed that the executive take possession of
private enterprise was without constitutional authority and invalid).
154. 350 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied. 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
155. Id. at 456-57.
156. 772 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1991).
157. Id. at 1298.
158. Exec. Order No. 12,114 at § 3-1.
159. An environmental assessment entails an agency making a threshold deter-
mination as to whether the effects of the agency's action on the human environment
will be significant enough to trigger implementation of the environmental impact
statement process or preparation of a finding of "no significant impact" (FONSI).
Council on Environmental Quality Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1991).
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out extraterritorial actions. Even if Executive Order 12,114
does apply, by issuing the FONSI, the Department has satis-
fied its responsibilities.
D. Judicial interpretations of NEPA's extraterritorial
applicability.
Several court decisions have found NEPA inapplicable
extraterritorially, based on specific facts. Natural Resource
Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) v. Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission.160 In NRDC, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
held that NEPA does not apply in the context of nuclear ex-
port licensing decisions. 6' The court reasoned that the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978, permits the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (the "Commission") to disregard foreign impacts
when it licenses nuclear exports.'62 Basing its decision on a
previous United States Supreme Court decision, the NRDC
court held that "NEPA's requirement of preparation of a de-
tailed EIS must yield where a clear conflict in statutory au-
thority is unavoidable."' 63 The court explicitly restricted its
decision to nuclear export licensing decisions, recognizing that
the will of Congress was that the Commission rely on the eval-
uation and foreign policy judgment made by the executive
branch.' '1 64
The district court in Greenpeace USA v. Stone,"5 stated
that, although Congress may have intended NEPA to apply
extraterritorially under certain circumstances, it failed to,
clearly express its intent in a way that was significant enough
to cause this court to interfere with an agreement between the
President and the West German government. The agreement
160. 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
161. Id. at 1366.
162. Id. at 1363. Section-2153e requires the President to "negotiate bilateral or
multilateral agreements 'for cooperation between the parties in protecting the inter-
national environment.'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2153(e)(Supp. II 1978)).
163. Id. at 1385 (quoting Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assoc., 426 U.S.
776 (1976)) (Robinson, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 1363-66.
165. 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990).
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regarded the transport of nerve gas stockpiles from Germany
to the United States for incineration. Because this agreement
implicated serious foreign policy concerns, the court deter-
mined that it would not require compliance with NEPA ab-
sent a clear expression of congressional intent.'
Several courts have also held NEPA applicable to trust
territories. In People of Enewetak v. Laird,"6 7 residents of the
Enewetak Atoll in the Pacific Ocean alleged that several
branches of the U.S. military had failed to properly assess the
effects on the atoll of nuclear defense testing which involved
simulated nuclear blasts. The District Court of Hawaii consid-
ered both the broad language of NEPA and the fact that the
territory in question was not under the jurisdiction of any
other nation. The court held that, under NEPA, the term "na-
tion" includes trust territories and all areas under United
States control, and that NEPA applied to the trust
territory.'68
In People of Saipan v. United States,'69 the District
Court of Hawaii, in deciding the issue of whether NEPA ap-
plies to trust territories, explained that the Supreme Court in
Foley looked at NEPA as a whole, its legislative history, and
at administrative interpretations. 110 The court also concluded
that NEPA applies to all areas which the United States con-
trols and that the Mariana Islands was not a "foreign
country.''7
Although the district court in People of Saipan was
presented with the issue of whether NEPA applies extraterri-
torially, the court did not reach a decision. The court merely
held that the trust government's action was not a "federal
agency" action. Therefore, the action was specifically ex-
empted from review under the APA.'
166. Id. at 763.
167. 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Haw. 1973).
168. Id. at 814-19.
169. 356 F. Supp. 645 (D. Haw. 1973).
170. Id. at 650:
171. Id. at 655-56.
172. Id. at 655; see APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a),
(b) (1988).
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Sierra Club v. Adams'73 involved a challenge by an envi-
ronmental organization to the EIS prepared and processed by
the Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of the
Federal Highway Administration as it related to the use of
United States funds for the construction of a 250-mile section
of the Pan American Highway spanning the Darien Gap in
eastern Panama and adjacent Colombia. 174 Environmental or-
ganizations claimed that the Government failed to adequately
address several issues regarding the highway's impacts includ-
ing: 1) the spread of hoof-and-mouth disease (Aftosa) to the
U.S.; 2) alternatives to the proposed highway; and 3) the ef-
fects of the road on indigenous peoples. 1' 5 The District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals "agreed" that NEPA required as-
sessment of the spread of Aftosa into the United States, which
the Government said it "never questioned. ' 176 The court held
that NEPA also required assessment of alternatives because
this was an extension of the Aftosa discussion.'77
The court also decided that since the environmental orga-
nizations established standing to challenge the EIS on at least
one ground, in the "public interest" they should be able to
challenge it on other grounds. 78 The court held that the EIS
complied with NEPA yet never reached the issue of whether
NEPA applied to the "purely local" effects the highway would
have on indigenous peoples. The court stated, "[I]n view of
the conclusions that we reach in this case, we need only as-
sume, without deciding, that NEPA is fully applicable to con-
struction in Panama. We leave resolution of this important is-
sue to another day.'117 9
In Wilderness Society v. Morton,'8 Canadian applicants
sought to intervene in a NEPA action brought by United
States petitioners based on effects the trans-Alaska pipeline
173. 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
174. Id. at 390.
175. Id. at 391.
176. Id. at 394-95.
177. Id. at 395-96.
178. Id. at 391-92.
179. Id. at 392 n.14.
180. 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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would have in Canada. The court only decided the issue of
intervention, holding that intervention was proper since the
interests of the intervenors were sufficiently antagonistic to
the interests of the United States petitioners. The court did
not address whether NEPA required an assessment of the Ca-
nadian effects of the action taken in the United States, but
stated that "[w]hether the Secretary [of the Interior] complies
with... NEPA... is a question which will be decided [later]
in this litigation. '" 181
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana
Laws v. United States (NORML) 82 involved a challenge by a
non-profit corporation to the United States' participation in
Mexican spraying of toxic substances on marijuana. They
claimed injuries to themselves from the toxic substances due
to both their personal presence in Mexico and to their use of
marijuana imported from Mexico. On the issue of the extra-
territorial application of NEPA the court stated:
in view of defendant's willingness to prepare an 'envi-
ronmental analysis' of the Mexico effects of United
States support of that nation's narcotics eradication pro-
gram, together with the EIS required by NEPA as to the
impact of that program upon the United States, the
Court need not reach the issue and need only assume
without deciding, that NEPA is fully applicable to the
Mexican herbicide spraying program.'83
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
For a brief summary of the arguments refer to page six.
Melanie H. Fund
Deborah M. Robertson
Paul M. Schmidt
181. Id. at 1262.
182. 452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978).
183. Id. at 1233 (emphasis added).
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